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Author is a senior law student and intends to take his Bar Exams this 2010, and this site will be his repository of cases he will be digesting for his Bar preparations. Feel free to visit the site - www.casedigest.com.

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Nagrampa vs. People (G.R. No. 146211)

Facts:Manuel Nagrampa purchased porcelain excavator equipment from Fedcor Trading Corporation on an installment basis. He then issued checks to be drawn against Security Bank and Trust Company. The checks were dishonored on the ground that the account was already closed. He was then charge with violation of BP 22. In his defense he claimed that he is not guilty of estafa because no damage was caused to FEDCOR and the back hoe being unserviceable was returned to FEDCOR

The trial court found him guilty and was ordered to pay FEDCOR the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.

Issue:Whether or not he is liable for violation of BP 22 despite no notice of dishonor was given.

Held:Yes, because the account was closed for four years prior to the transaction. He knew fully well that the check he issued would be dishonored and the 90-day grace period given to him by law is unavailing.

Vicky Ty vs. People (G.R. No. 149275)

Facts: Ty’s mother was confined in Manila Doctor's Hospital to which a medical bill amounting to 600,000 pesos was made to be paid to TY, after signing a contract of responsibility with the hospital. Ty, issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which were dishonored for being drawn against a closed a account. Manila Doctors Hospital then instituted criminal actions against Ty for violation of BP22.

In her defense she alleged that she issued the checks involuntarily because her mother threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane treatment she allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. She further claimed that no consideration was obtained by her because all the checks were made as payment to the medical bills.

Issue: Whether or not valuable consideration exists.

Held: Under Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, it is presumed that valuable consideration exist upon the issuance of a check in the absence of evidence to the contrary.Valuable consideration is any benefit, interest or profit accruing to the party. The use of the hospital facilities and services may be deemed as such.

Morano vs. Vivo (20 SCRA 562)

Facts: Petitioners are Chinese nationals (Chan Sau Wah from Fukein, with a minor child from prior marriage, Fu Yan Fun) who were granted a temporary visitor’s visa as mom-immigrant for 2 months upon posting P4k cash bond to visit a cousin in the Philippines. She soon married to Esteban Morano, a Filipino Citizen, on January 24, 1962 and gave birth to a child, Esteban Morano, Jr. After several extensions to prolong stay in Philippines, their visas expired on Sept. 10, 1962 and were ordered by Commissioner of Immigration (COI) on Aug. 31, 1962 thru a letter, to leave the country on or before Sept. 10, 1962 with warning of issuance of warrant of arrest for failure to leave and confiscation of bond.

Petitioners then filed with the CFI of Manila for Mandamus to compel COI to cancel their ACR, to stop issuing arrest warrant, and preliminary injunction from confiscating their bond. They argue that Chan Sau Wah became a Filipino Citizen upon marriage to Esteban Morano by virtue of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Revised Naturalization Act). Likewise, it argues that Section 37 of the Naturalization Law is unconstitutional for allowing the COI to issue warrant of arrest and effecting deportation without judicial intervention enshrined in the Constitution. CFI decided partly against petitioners, thus, COI and petitioners both appealed to SC.

Issues:

• Whether or not the marriage of Chan Sau Wah to Esteban Morano makes her a Filipino citizen.
• Whether or not Section 37 of the Naturalization Law empowering the COI to issue a warrant of arrest, and deport upon a warrant on deportation cases is unconstitutional for are covered by the Constitutional mandate on searches and seizures without judicial intervention required under the Constitution on searches and seizures.

Ruling:

Citizenship. Marriage to a Filipino citizen does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen. She must show that she possess all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications required by the Naturalization Law requiring as follows:

• Valid marriage; and
• Alien woman herself might be lawfully naturalized

In the additional stipulation of facts of July 3, 1963, petitioners admit that Chan Sau Wah is not possessed of all the qualifications required by the Naturalization Law. Thus, she did not become a Filipino citizen.

Searches and seizures. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions. Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceeding for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation.

Petition for mandamus and prohibition with respect to petitioners Chan Sau Wah is hereby denied; and judgment declaring her a citizen of the Philippines, directing COI to cancel her Alien Certificate of Registration and other immigration papers, and declaring the preliminary injunction with respect to her permanent, are all hereby set aside; and in all other respects, the decision appealed is hereby affirmed.

Castro vs. Pabalan (70 SCRA 477)

Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when required to answer. Application alleged that applicants wee informed and claimed that they verified the report that Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union without specifying the particular place in the Barrio. No complete description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued.

Held: Search warrant issued illegal for violation of the 1935 Constitution and the Rules of Court because the two basic requirements are not complied with: (a) no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, (b) the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized, thus, a general warrant. However, things seized cannot be returned and shall be destroyed, except the liquors, playing cards, distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin.

Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

1. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
2. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
3. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.
   

People vs. Beriales, et al. (70 SCRA 361)

Facts: A case of three men who were charged for the murder of Saturnina on Sept. 13, 1974. During the hearing on Nov. 26, 1974, upon motion of the defense the Court ordered the re-investigation of the case pending submission of the Fiscal of its reports. Couple of postponements was made until Dec. 13, 1974 hearing when the Court proceeded with the arraignment and trial in the absence of the Fiscal and its report on re-investigation, and over the disagreement of the defense. The CFI of Leyte relied on the private prosecutor being authorized by the Fiscal to present evidence and the defense presumed to have waived its right over its disagreement. Trial then proceeded and the 3 found guilty of he offense. Thus, this appeal on the constitutional requirement of due process.

Issue: Whether or not due process of law had been observed.

Held: Constitutional due process was violated, thus, case remanded to CFI for arraignment and trial. Court should have held in abeyance the trial while the report on e-investigation was still pending. Consistent disregard of the defense objection on the arraignment, trial, presentation of private prosecutor’s evidence, and rendition of judgment violates due process. Prosecutor or Fiscal entrusted with the investigation is duty bound to take charge until final termination. They shall have direction and control of the criminal prosecution over private prosecutors.

Ermita-Malate Hotel/Motel vs. City of Manila (20 SCRA 849)

Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned for its violation of due process:

1. refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
   

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.

Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution?

Held: Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted.

PBCom. vs. CIR(GR 112024. Jan. 28, 1999)

FACTS:

Petitioner, Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first and second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00 by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively. Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for the year-ended December 31, 1985. For the succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the petitioner likewise reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax payable for the year.

But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. The lessees withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987, petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985.

Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.

Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for Review on November 18, 1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309 entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue."

The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground that the Petition was filed out of time as the same was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period. A motion for Reconsideration was denied and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court.

Issues:

a) Whether or not Revenue Regulations No. 7-85 which alters the reglementary period from two (2) years to ten (10) years is valid.

b) Whether or not the petition for tax refund had already prescribed.

Ruling:

1. RR 7-85 altering the 2-year prescriptive period imposed by law to 10-year prescriptive period is invalid.

Administrative issuances are merely interpretations and not expansions of the provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency, the law prevails over them. Administrative agencies have no legislative power.

“When the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RMC 7-85,

changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of excess quarterly income tax payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.”

“It bears repeating that Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings (in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement.”

“Further, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the express provision of a statute. Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute.”

2. By implication of the above, claim for refund had already prescribed.

Since the petition had been filed beyond the prescriptive period, the same has already prescribed. The fact that the final adjusted return show an excess tax credit does not automatically entitle taxpayer claim for refund without any express intent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED, with COSTS against the petitioner.